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BOUND & GAGGED:
POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO “AG-GAG” LAWS
JESSALEE LANDFRIED†
In an effort to stifle undercover investigations of factory farms, the
agricultural industry has pushed forward a slate of bills that limit audio
and video recording on farms. This Note describes the different types
of “ag-gag” bills legislators have proposed across the nation, and
evaluates potential First Amendment challenges to the bills. The Note
concludes that the ag-gag laws most likely to pass do not obviously
implicate First Amendment rights and advises activists to plan their
investigations in anticipation of future legal challenges.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a series of undercover videos have exposed
shocking animal abuses and unsanitary practices at factory farms
across the country. One 2011 video showed employees at a Texas
1
cattle farm bashing cows’ heads with pickaxes. Another, filmed in
2009 at a Vermont slaughterhouse, showed a worker pouring water
on a downed calf’s head to increase the electric current as he shocked
2
the calf again and again. In California, a 2008 video showed workers
pushing downed cows with a forklift to force them to stand for

†
J.D. Candidate at Duke University School of Law and a M.E.M. Candidate at Duke’s
Nicholas School for the Environment. I am grateful for the assistance of Zachary Kolodin and
Michelle Nowlin in reviewing early drafts of this Note.
1. Lester Aldrich, Texas Sheriff Investigates Animal-Cruelty Video Rattling Cattle Market,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704658704576
275091620222926.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Kevin Lewis, Charges Filed in E6 Cattle Case,
PLAINVIEW HERALD (May 26, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.myplainview.com/news/article_
5ee448d4-87e0-11e0-be0a-001cc4c03286.html.
2. John Curran, 2 Vt. Slaughterhouse Workers Charged with Cruelty, BOS. GLOBE (June
4, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/06/04/2_vt_slaughterhouse_workers_
charged_with_cruelty.
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inspection. The workers then subjected the cattle to a “veterinary
version of waterboarding” by shooting high-intensity water sprays up
4
their noses.
The abuses in Texas and Vermont both led to criminal charges
against the farm operators and the employees who perpetrated the
5
violent acts. The California video led not only to criminal charges of
animal abuse, but also to the largest meat recall in U.S. history: 143
million pounds of beef—the meatpacker’s entire production for two
6
years—were recalled.
These exposés impose high costs on the meat industry in the
7
form of litigation, recalls, and lost sales. To shut off this costly flow of
undercover videos, politicians across the nation have recently pushed
8
forward a series of anti-whistleblower bills known as “ag-gag” laws.
Although they can take different forms, the ag-gag bills all work to
9
severely limit documentation of agricultural activities. Three states
have had similar laws on the books since the 1990s, although they
were seemingly uncontroversial when passed and are rarely, if ever,
10
applied. But between 2011 and 2013, legislative interest in ag-gag

3. Rick Weiss, Video Reveals Violations of Laws, Abuse of Cows at Slaughterhouses,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/29/AR2008012903054.html.
4. Id.
5. Mark Bittman, Op-Ed., Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A27,
available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals; Curran,
supra note 2.
6. David Brown, USDA Orders Largest Meat Recall in U.S. History, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 2008, at A1.
7. GLYNN T. TONSOR & NICOLE J. OLYNK, KAN. STATE UNIV., U.S. MEAT DEMAND:
THE INFLUENCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE MEDIA COVERAGE (2010), available at
http://www.agmanager.info/livestock/marketing/animalwelfare/MF2951.pdf (finding that media
reports significantly reduce demand for pork and poultry products).
8. Food writer Mark Bittman coined the term “ag gag” in a New York Times editorial.
See Bittman, supra note 5. The term is now widely used to describe laws that limit
photographing or video recording of agricultural facilities.
9. Although the undercover investigations targeted by the bills all took place at livestock
facilities, many of the bills are specifically drafted so as to cover both animal and crop
production facilities. For example, Iowa’s new law defines “agricultural production facility” to
include “an animal facility . . . and a crop production facility.” H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb.
(Iowa 2012).
10. Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota passed ag-gag laws in the 1990s. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-1827 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02
(2011).
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11

bills exploded. Legislators in sixteen states introduced ag-gag bills.
12
So far, only Iowa and Utah successfully enacted the bills, but ag-gag
laws remain pending in nine states. Despite this relatively low success
rate, more and more state legislators are proposing ag-gag bills. Two
13
bills were introduced in 2011, six in 2012, and nine in 2013.
This Note provides an overview of ag-gag bills in the context of
the First Amendment. Are any of these ag-gag bills constitutional? If
so, are some more likely to pass constitutional muster than others?
Part I provides an overview of applicable First Amendment doctrine.
Part II examines the different forms taken by ag-gag laws across the
nation and explores potential First Amendment challenges to the aggag bills. Part II also touches on “animal terrorism” laws, which are
not always included under the ag-gag umbrella, but can also be used
to restrict documentation of farm activities. Part III proposes
precautions undercover activists can take to protect themselves
against the ag-gag laws.
I. POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO AG-GAG LAWS
14

Opponents often assert that ag-gag bills are unconstitutional.
As Part II will explore, the accuracy of that assessment depends

11. Nine states introduced ag-gag bills in 2013. See H.R. 0110, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H.
2013); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2013); S. 391, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess.
(Neb. 2013); S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2013); H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2013); S. 1248, 108th
Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); Assemb. 343, 2013–14 Reg.
Sess. (Ca. 2013). Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, and
Utah all considered ag-gag laws in 2011 and 2012. See S. 1184, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2012); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); S. 184, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2012); Iowa H.R. 589 (2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); S. 695, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); Leg. 915, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); S. 5172, 235th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); H.R. 187, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). This list is
updated as of March 20, 2013.
12. IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2012).
13. See supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Jason Clayworth, Animal Rights Spokeswoman: ‘Ag Gag’ Won’t Stop Us!,
DES MOINES REG., (Mar. 1, 2012), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/
2012/03/01/animals-rights-spokeswoman-ag-gag-wont-stop-us (“[Activists] contend the bill is a
constitutional violation of free speech”); Dan Flynn, Iowa Approves Nation’s First ‘Ag-Gag’
Law, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/iowaapproves-nations-first-ag-gag-law/ (“Many see HF589 as an unconstitutional infringement on
First Amendment rights.”); Michelle Kretzer, Cloris Leachman Takes on ‘Ag Gag’, PETA FILES
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2012/02/27/cloris-leachman-takes-onag-gag.aspx (writing that PETA is “fighting back against this unconstitutional measure” in
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greatly on the form of the bill. The content of the bills varies
significantly from state to state. In general, though, the ag-gag bills
can be roughly grouped into five categories. The specific
characteristics of these bills will be explored in greater detail in Part
II. In brief, each ag-gag bill is drafted to criminalize one of the
following behaviors:






Filming any agricultural activities (often called bans on
“agricultural interference”);
Employment fraud in agricultural settings;
Distribution of agricultural recordings;
Trespass in agricultural facilities; and
Delayed reporting of animal abuse.

This Part examines four potential First Amendment challenges
to these ag-gag laws: A) overbreadth; B) freedom of the press; C)
presumption against content-based restrictions and prior restraints;
and D) limitations on incidental restrictions.
The strongest First Amendment challenges could be mounted
against the broad “agricultural-interference” bills and those that limit
distribution of recordings. However, because the other approaches to
ag-gag laws intentionally evade issues of speech and expression, they
will be much more difficult to challenge under the First Amendment.
A. Overbreadth
A law violates the First Amendment for overbreadth if “a
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in
15
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” A 2010 Supreme
16
Court case, United States v. Stevens, provides the most apt precedent
in the ag-gag context. Stevens applied the overbreadth doctrine to
invalidate a statute banning the creation and sale of depictions of
17
harm to animals. A First Amendment defense against ag-gag bills

Utah); Nathan Runkle, Video: CNN Covers Iowa “Ag-Gag” Law Debate, MFA BLOG (Mar. 7,
2012),
http://www.mfablog.org/2012/03/video-cnn-covers-iowa-ag-gag-law-debate.html
(describing animal rights commentators as addressing the “unconstitutional nature of the bill”).
15. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010).
17. Id. at 1592; 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
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based on Stevens may not be as strong as some observers have
18
implied, however.
Congress passed the statute at issue in Stevens in reaction to
“crush” films, a genre of sexual-fetish films that depict animals being
19
killed, usually by being stepped on. However, the statute more
broadly criminalized both the creation and sale of depictions of any
harm to animals (with the stipulation that the depicted conduct must
also be illegal in the jurisdiction where the depiction was made, sold,
20
or possessed). Emphasizing the possibility that the statute could be
21
construed to ban otherwise protected activities, the Court struck it
22
down for overbreadth.
Like the statute at issue in Stevens, some ag-gag bills (particularly
the agricultural-interference type) are written so broadly as to
criminalize otherwise protected activities. For example, a Wyoming
bill would find a person guilty of “interference with an agricultural
operation” if they “knowingly or intentionally [record] an image or
sound from the agricultural operation by concealing or placing a
recording device on the premises of the agricultural operation”
23
without the consent of the owner.
These bills could be construed to ban legally permissible
activities like employees taking pictures at work or a tourist taking a
picture of a bucolic farm scene. Courts therefore have a strong basis
to find that the agricultural interference ag-gag laws are
unconstitutionally overbroad.
However, critical differences between undercover activist films
and the films addressed in Stevens may weaken Stevens’ precedential

18. See, e.g., Mickey H. Osterreicher, Photography & the Law: New Laws Have Significant
Impact, JPG MAG (Mar. 11, 2012), http://jpgmag.com/news/2012/03/new-laws-have-significantimpact-on-photographyrecording.html (noting that Stevens spurred some legislatures’ changes
to ag-gag proposals); Amanda Peterka, State Legislatures Take Up Bills Barring Undercover
Videos of Confined Animal Feeding Operations, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/05greenwire-state-legislatures-take-up-bills-barringunder-88103.html?scp=4&sq=ag%20gag&st=cse (noting that ag-gag laws could “run afoul of
United States v. Stevens”).
19. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583. The defendant in Stevens was not a producer of crush films,
but sold videos of dogfights. Id. at 1583.
20. Id. at 1582.
21. Id. at 1588–89 (stating that a film could be in violation of the statute if it was made in a
state that allowed a certain type of hunting and was then sold in another state that prohibited
that type of hunting).
22. Id. at 1592.
23. H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
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value in this context. Activists planning to challenge ag-gag laws
based on the case should remain aware of three major distinctions.
First, the statute in question in Stevens is distinguishable from the
proposed ag-gag laws because it foreclosed the sale of depictions of
24
harm done to animals. Undercover activist films are not for sale but
are distributed free of charge to educate the public and spur political
change. Agricultural activists’ films would therefore not have been
within the purview of that statute. Some courts may find that this
fundamental difference renders the Stevens precedent inapplicable to
25
the ag-gag context.
Second, the Stevens holding is quite limited. Stevens does not
26
hold that the First Amendment protects depictions of animal cruelty.
Much more narrowly, it holds that the statute in question was too
broad. The Court specifically declined to reach the question of
whether a more precise statute banning depictions of certain types of
27
animal cruelty could be constitutional. The case therefore does not
protect undercover activists’ films on the basis of their content.
Lastly, ag-gag videos are filmed in secrecy, without the
permission of the private property owner. Crush films, dogfighting
films, and hunting videos are more likely to be filmed with the
property owner’s permission because their goal is to make money, not
to expose the property owner’s unsavory practices. Property rights
are thus heavily implicated in the ag-gag bills, but they were not at all
addressed in Stevens.
These distinctions indicate that Stevens may not be squarely
applicable to ag-gag laws. The differences between undercover
activist films and the types of films contemplated in Stevens may be
potent enough for some courts to decline to rely on Stevens to strike
down ag-gag laws.
Of the proposed ag-gag bills, the agricultural interference type is
the most undermined by the overbreadth doctrine. As with the
statute addressed in Stevens, the agricultural interference bills are so

24. See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
25. Activists could consider charging a nominal fee for their videos in order to trigger
Stevens applicability. Exploring this interesting possibility is unfortunately outside of the scope
of this Note.
26. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583–84. However, the Court does state in dicta that depictions
of animal cruelty should not be categorically denied First Amendment protection like
defamation or obscenity. Id. at 1584.
27. Id. at 1592.
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broadly drafted as to have the potential to criminalize otherwise
protected speech. As will be discussed below, although this type of
bill is fairly common, none has yet been enacted into law. If such a bill
were enacted, its extremely broad nature would likely render it
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges based on Stevens’
precedent.
B. Freedom of the Press
Undercover activist films have more in common with journalism
than they do with crush films or hunting videos. They seek to expose
an important, hidden truth to the public by using secret informationgathering techniques. Undercover journalism has an ambiguous
constitutional foundation, however. There is no conclusive Supreme
Court ruling or circuit court consensus on the newsgathering rights of
the press, not to mention the murky territory of citizen journalism.
Courts have been careful to avoid categorical determinations about
28
journalists’ liability for undercover recording. For example, in
29
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., the California Supreme
Court held that a psychic who had been secretly filmed at work could
recover for the tort of intrusion, even though the defendant reporters
30
did uncover her unethical behavior. The court specifically said,
however, that it did not “hold or imply that investigative journalists
31
necessarily commit a tort by secretly recording events.” Given the
unclear status of undercover reporting, it is difficult to predict how
courts would treat animal-rights activists’ undercover filming, even
without ag-gag laws on the books.
This Section will explore these ambiguities and highlight two
main lessons that may be drawn from the case law: 1) the First
Amendment does not provide immunity to journalists against civil or
criminal charges following undercover investigations; and 2) news
outlets’ distribution of accurate information is strongly protected by
the First Amendment, depending to some extent on how the
information was obtained.

28. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right To Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 121 (2008).
29. 987 P.2d 67 (Cal.1999).
30. Id. at 77.
31. Id. at 69.
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1. No Journalistic Immunity
The First Amendment does not free undercover investigators
from civil or criminal liability, even if they ultimately produce an
accurate video that serves the public good. The Supreme Court has
made clear that the First Amendment does not provide the press with
limitless protection against prosecution for breaking the law in the
32
course of journalistic endeavors. Reporters’ First Amendment
defenses have been rejected in cases involving both undercover and
33
34
open investigations, for crimes including trespass, harassment,
35
36
disorderly conduct, and fraud.
37
Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., a Fourth Circuit case
following the high-profile exposé of unsanitary practices at Food Lion
grocery stores, provides insight into how courts analyze charges
against undercover journalists. In Food Lion, two ABC reporters
obtained employment at two different Food Lion grocery store
38
outlets, where they secretly filmed other employees handling meat.
The footage showed employees “repackaging and redating fish that
had passed the expiration date, grinding expired beef with fresh beef,
and applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration date in
order to mask the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet food
39
section.” The court addressed claims of fraud, trespass, and breach
of loyalty against the two undercover reporters responsible for the
32. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256 A.2d 131, 131 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (holding that an undercover reporter posing as a potential patient in a private
medical office had no First Amendment affirmative defense because free speech did not confer
a privilege for trespass); Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839, 840–42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (holding
that newspersons who accompanied trespassing protestors onto the grounds of a proposed
nuclear facility were not shielded by the First Amendment from state criminal prosecution in
their news gathering function).
34. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the First
Amendment did not shield a paparazzo photographer from criminal liability for his constant
surveillance of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, despite her status as a public figure).
35. See, e.g., Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1989) (holding that the First
Amendment does not provide news gatherers with special rights of access as surrogates for the
general public).
36. See, e.g., Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 793–94 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an undercover reporter who secretly filmed abuses at a facility for
mentally retarded persons was not protected by the First Amendment against tort claims for
fraud or trespass).
37. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
38. Id. at 510.
39. Id. at 511.
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investigation and found that the First Amendment did not bar the
40
claims.
The truth of the reporters’ allegations and the accuracy of the
footage were not at issue in the litigation. Food Lion did not sue for
41
defamation, but rather relied on traditional tort claims. Based
mostly on state law in North Carolina and South Carolina, the court
held that the ABC employees breached their duty of loyalty to their
42
employer, Food Lion, and committed trespass. ABC attempted to
argue that the First Amendment barred the plaintiffs’ recovery, but
43
the court disagreed.
Notably, however, although the court found ABC guilty, it
44
awarded Food Lion a mere $2 in damages. Other courts may
similarly treat journalists’ offenses leniently when the information
exposed by their undercover investigations is of significant social
value.
The plaintiffs’ approach in Food Lion is representative of a trend
over the last fifteen years where, “[b]y targeting the media’s
newsgathering behavior, plaintiffs have—with mixed success—
avoided the formidable constitutional shield that protects media
45
expression.”
The most successful ag-gag approach—banning
agricultural-employment fraud—fits well within this trend.
In sum, the importance of activists’ documentary footage does
not provide protection against prosecution for civil or criminal
violations, with or without ag-gag laws on the books.
2. Strong Protection for News Outlets’ Distribution of Footage
News institutions benefit from strong First Amendment
protection for publishing accurate information. The extent of this
protection depends somewhat on whether the information was
gathered illegally, and the extent to which the publishing institution
was complicit in that illegality. News institutions cannot be punished
for publishing information they obtain lawfully, even if their source is

40. Id. at 511, 520.
41. Id. at 510.
42. Id. at 516.
43. Id. at 520–21.
44. Id. at 524. The jury initially awarded $5.5 million in compensatory and punitive
damages, which was reduced by the trial court judge to $316,400 in total damages. Id. at 511.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and limited the damages to $2. Id. at 524.
45. Ugland, supra note 28, at 131.
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a third party who acquired it illegally. Further, the news institution’s
awareness that a third party acquired the information illegally does
46
not negate First Amendment protection. For example, in Bartnicki
v. Vopper, the Supreme Court held that a radio program was
protected by the First Amendment in disclosing the contents of an
illegally intercepted phone conversation about the local teachers’
union, even though the program had reason to know that the tapes
47
were illegally intercepted. The Court held that “a stranger’s illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from
48
speech about a matter of public concern.”
There is little guidance, however, on the extent to which news
institutions are protected when they are complicit in illegal
newsgathering. The Court’s decision to protect the radio broadcast in
Bartnicki was influenced by the fact that the hosts were not complicit
49
in the unlawful acquisition of the tapes. The Court avoided making a
broader determination as to whether publication would have been
50
forbidden had the radio program been complicit. Other courts have
not barred publication when the newsgathering institution was
engaged in illegal activity. For example, in both Sanders and Food
Lion, ABC News orchestrated and supervised the undercover
51
filmmaking. In both cases, however, ABC was punished not for
publication of the illegally acquired footage, but rather for the torts
52
committed in the process of gathering the footage. In Food Lion, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that Food Lion
could not recover publication damages because “it was [Food Lion’s]
food handling practices themselves—not the method by which they
were recorded or published—which caused the loss of consumer
53
confidence.”
The case law demonstrates that news outlets that publish
accurate undercover investigations benefit from very strong First
Amendment protections. However, the cases’ applicability to

46. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18, 528 (2001).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 535.
49. See id. at 532 n.19.
50. Id. at 528–29.
51. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999);
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 70 (Cal. 1999).
52. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510; Sanders, 978 P.2d at 70.
53. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522.
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undercover citizen activists is unclear. There are no settled legal
definitions of “journalism” or “journalists,” which are complex terms
in a time when bloggers break important news stories and passersby
54
film significant events with cellphone cameras. At the very least,
there is no consensus in the courts on whether citizen journalists
should receive any of the protections typically afforded to
55
professional journalists. The First Amendment thus leaves open
significant questions for undercover activist filmmakers and the
organizations that hire and support them, neither of which are
traditional news institutions. Courts may be influenced by the fact
that reporters are subject to professional standards and that their
employers have an institutional interest in producing accurate
56
journalism. If future jurisprudence better defines the role of citizen
journalists, suits filed against activists under ag-gag laws will be
57
significantly affected.
In sum, the First Amendment does not clearly protect ag-gag
filmmakers, but does strongly protect news institutions that distribute
their films, as long as the films are accurate. To the filmmakers
themselves, the First Amendment may be most helpful on the back
end, once undercover films have been distributed and litigation has
been pursued against the activists. At that point, there is a strong
likelihood that courts will treat activists leniently if they have created
truthful videos that depict information of value to the public. It is, of
course, less than ideal to rely on potential leniency as protection. Part
III will propose precautionary measures activists can take to protect
themselves.

54. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 518 (2007).
55. See discussion of the first amendment protections for professional journalists infra Part
I.C.
56. The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics states that journalists should
avoid undercover investigations unless the information gathered is 1) vital to the public and 2)
not available through other means. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS,
http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
57. Courts are tentatively beginning to address this thorny issue. In a 2006 case, the
California Court of Appeal held that website editors were entitled to the protections of
California’s reporter’s privilege shield law. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 77
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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C. Presumption Against Content-Based Restrictions and Prior
Restraints
News institutions, journalists, and citizen activists are all
protected by a strong presumption against the validity of laws that
impose content-based restrictions on speech or any prior restraints on
58
speech.
Content-based restrictions on speech regulate subject matter or
59
60
viewpoint. They are presumptively invalid, and subject to strict61
scrutiny review. To overcome this presumption, the burden is on the
government to prove that the content-based statute is the least
62
restrictive means to promote a compelling government interest.
Content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of speech
are held to intermediate scrutiny and are therefore more likely to be
constitutional, particularly if they leave open acceptable alternative
63
methods of communication.
Of the different types of ag-gag bills, the agricultural-interference
laws and distribution limitations are the most likely to be struck down
as unconstitutional, content-based restrictions. The agriculturalinterference bills would enact broad bans against filming in
64
agricultural settings. Arguably, therefore, these types of bills ban
films based on their subject matter—agricultural activities—and
should be subject to the strict scrutiny review applicable to contentbased restrictions. On the other hand, bill proponents would likely
argue that the prohibitions are actually content-neutral because they
are based on the place, not the subject, of the films. Even if a court
agreed, these types of laws might not hold up to intermediate scrutiny
given that they do not leave open any alternative method of
communicating the same information.

58. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980) (“[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’” (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 282 (1951))).
59. See Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011).
60. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
61. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009).
62. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004).
63. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (providing the example that regulating traffic noise
is content-neutral because “[n]o matter what its message, a roving sound truck that blares at 2 a.
m. disturbs neighborhood tranquility”).
64. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
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As for the bills that impose limits on distribution of recordings
made on agricultural premises, these are likewise content-based
because they impose restrictions based on the same agricultural
65
content as the agricultural-interference films.
Additionally, neither type of bill serves a compelling government
purpose. Indeed, these bills more likely restrict a compelling
government interest in public access to information relating to food
safety and animal cruelty. These ag-gag laws therefore are unlikely to
survive a strict-scrutiny test and would be held unconstitutional.
Some content-based ag-gag bills might also be invalid under the
66
doctrine of prior restraints, which imposes a strong presumption
67
against bans on expression of ideas prior to their publication. The
Supreme Court has called prior restraints “the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,” noting that
they can be most damaging when they “fall[] upon the
68
communication of news and commentary on current events.”
Ag-gag laws that ban distribution of films made in agricultural
settings are clear examples of unconstitutional prior-restraint laws. By
prohibiting distribution of audio and video recordings, they
essentially institute a before-the-fact ban on publication. These types
of bills would therefore impose a prior restraint and are thus
presumptively invalid.
D. Limits on Incidental Restrictions of Speech
In some cases, regulations that do not directly address speech but
in practice function to limit expressive conduct can be found
unconstitutional. These “incidental restrictions” are unconstitutional
if they are “greater than necessary to further a substantial
69
governmental interest.” In contrast to content-based restrictions,
incidental restrictions need not be the least intrusive means of
achieving a compelling governmental interest to pass constitutional

65. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
66. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 17 (Cal. 2003) (“[A] prior restraint is a
content-based restriction on speech prior to its occurrence.” (quoting Planned Parenthood
Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224, 1230 (Cal. 1994)).
67. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 733 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[E]very man
shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without
any prior restraint . . . .”).
68. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
69. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987).
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muster. Rather, they need only promote “a substantial governmental
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
70
regulation.”
The most successful ag-gag bills—those criminalizing
agricultural-employment fraud—place incidental restrictions on
71
speech. They do not directly limit expression, but instead institute a
rule that will have that effect in application. Likewise, bills that
impose reporting time limits or redefine trespass would place
72
incidental restrictions on speech. Although they do not directly
regulate speech, they impose prohibitions which have the practical
effect of chilling speech. However, because incidental restrictions are
not held to as strict of a standard as content-based regulations, these
laws are much more likely to be considered constitutional. For
example, the Supreme Court held that a National Park Service
regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks was constitutional,
even when it had the effect of prohibiting demonstrators from
73
sleeping in parks to make a political statement about homelessness.
The Court found that the incidental restriction on the protestors’
freedom of expression did not violate the First Amendment because
the regulation was content-neutral and was narrowly focused on a
substantial governmental interest in maintaining parks “in an
74
attractive and intact condition.”
A successful challenge to the ag-gag bills that pose incidental
restrictions on speech will hinge on whether the government can
demonstrate its substantial interest. State governments can probably
meet this relatively low bar: the government arguably has a
substantial interest in transparent hiring practices, protecting private
property, and ensuring timely reporting of animal abuses. However,
these arguments ring false because the “incidental” restrictions are
not at all incidental. They are deliberately crafted to limit expression.
Perhaps courts attuned to the context of these bills’ passage and to
the strong evidence that they were designed to evade First

70. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
71. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
72. See discussion infra Part II.C.4–5.
73. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
74. Id. at 296.

Landfried (Do Not Delete)

5/19/2013 10:45 PM

Spring 2013] FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO “AG-GAG” LAWS

391

75

Amendment issues would be more willing to strike down these laws.
Ultimately, given that agricultural-employment fraud laws are the
only ag-gag bills that have successfully passed, incidental-restraint
challenges might be activists’ best hope.
II. AG-GAG LAWS ACROSS AMERICA
This Part will provide context for the current legislative wave of
ag-gag bills by examining the older generation of ag-gag laws passed
in the 1990s, and outlining the features of existing animal-terrorism
laws. It will then describe five general categorizations for the
proposed and enacted ag-gag bills and discuss the hostile public
opposition to the new slate of bills.
A. Existing Ag-Gag Laws: Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota
Since 1990, Kansas has prohibited anyone from entering an
“animal facility” to make audio or video recordings “with the intent
76
to damage the enterprise.” By requiring intent to damage (not
included in any of the newly proposed ag-gag bills), the law is
ambiguous as to whether it covers undercover activists’ filmmaking.
Most likely, intent to damage does not include intent to reduce a
farm’s profits by exposing unsanitary conditions. While the relevant
77
chapter of Kansas’s code does not directly define “damage,” it does
include a provision for civil penalties that describes damages in more
78
detail. According to that provision, persons harmed by violations of
the code can collect civil penalties for all “actual and consequential
damages,” defined as “costs directly related to the field crop or
79
animal that has been damaged or destroyed.” Losses resulting from
negative publicity from an undercover video would arguably not be
“directly related” to the farm operations, and no animal would have
been “damaged or destroyed.”
If courts interpret “damage” more broadly, however, undercover
films could fall under the statute’s purview. Activists typically make

75. See, e.g., Clayworth, supra note 14 (citing Senate Democratic Leader Michael Gronstal
who said that lawmakers consulted Iowa’s Attorney General when crafting the bill to avoid
legal challenges); Osterreicher, supra note 18 (citing the Stevens precedent as the impetus for
some legislatures to change the drafting of their bills).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (2006).
77. See id. § 47-1826.
78. See id. § 47-1828.
79. Id.
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audio and video recordings with a variety of goals, including spurring
criminal investigations, reducing consumption of meat products, and
sparking public outrage at the facilities depicted. Those actions are
intentionally targeted to financially harm the enterprises, which could
arguably be considered “damage” under the law. Ultimately,
however, given that the Kansas code defines “damage” as requiring
costs directly related to code violations, it is more likely that courts
will interpret “damage” in a way that requires direct harm, and
undercover activists’ filmmaking would likely not be punishable
under the statute.
North Dakota’s ag-gag law, passed in 1991, forbids the act of
filming or photographing an animal facility without consent of the
owner or operator, regardless of intent and without reference to
80
damage.
Montana’s statute, also enacted in 1991, requires that the
offender enter the property “with the intent to commit criminal
81
defamation.”
In Montana, communication of defamatory
82
information is justified if the information is true. The requirement
that offenders must intend to distribute untrue information sets
Montana’s law apart from the other existing and proposed ag-gag
laws. No farm targeted by recent undercover activist films has
seriously protested the accuracy of footage taken on its premises.
Montana’s statute therefore does not criminalize the undercover
production of activist films, as long as the footage is accurate.
None of these existing laws appear to have been challenged in
court, nor did an online search reveal any charges filed based on these
83
statutes. Additionally, no activist films appear to have been created
84
in any of these three states. These laws therefore provide little
insight into potential paths for challenging ag-gag legislation, and
perhaps also indicate that such legislation does have a chilling effect

80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2011).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (2011).
82. Id. § 45-8-212(3)(a).
83. Based on a Westlaw search as of March 23, 2013.
84. Based on extensive online searches, including online searches of animal rights groups’
archives.
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on journalistic investigations. The proposed legislation is already
85
bringing new scrutiny to these rarely used statutes.
B. Animal-Terrorism Laws: State and Federal
In addition to the ag-gag laws dating to the 1990s, another set of
enacted legislation could also limit activists’ ability to document
abuses on farms. Generally known as animal-terrorism laws, these
statutes are typically geared towards stopping the most aggressive
types of animal rights activism, such as unauthorized release of
86
laboratory animals and vandalizing animal facilities. Minnesota
passed the first such law in 1988, and now at least seven other states
87
have enacted similar laws.
Many of these state laws were spurred by the 2006 adoption of
88
the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). While not
principally geared towards limiting documentation of farms, AETA
and its state progeny could potentially be used to deliver that result.
AETA forbids anyone with “the purpose of damaging or interfering
with” an animal enterprise from causing the loss of “any real or
89
personal property” of the enterprise or any person connected with it.
90
It also forbids conspiring to or attempting to cause such losses.
Under these laws, activists could be charged with “damaging”
animal enterprises by distributing undercover films recorded on
farms. The statute includes loss of profits in its definition of economic
damages, which could be used to argue that film distribution caused
91
“damage” to an enterprise. However, it also provides an exception
for “any lawful economic disruption” caused by “reaction to the
92
disclosure of information about an animal enterprise.” In states with
ag-gag laws, however, activists would no longer be acting lawfully,

85. See, e.g., Dan Flynn, Five States Now Have ‘Ag-Gag’ Laws on the Books, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/five-states-now-have-aggag-laws-on-the-books.
86. Cynthia Hodges, Detailed Discussion of State Animal ‘Terrorism’/Animal Enterprise
Interference Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2011), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/
ddusstateecoterrorism.htm.
87. Id. (indicating that Florida, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee, Oklahoma,
and Georgia all have some version of this type of law).
88. Id.
89. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006).
90. Id. § 43(a)(2)(c).
91. Id. § 43(d)(3).
92. Id. § 43 (d)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
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and therefore might lose the protection of this exception. Even
without an ag-gag law on the books, a state might find that activists
had violated any number of other laws—fraud, trespass, or breach of
loyalty, for example—that might render their economic disruption
unlawful. In sum, animal activists in states with and without ag-gag
laws could still be found in violation of AETA.
In March 2013, a federal district court found that a group of
animal rights activists did not have standing to challenge the
93
constitutionality of AETA. The court found that the plaintiffs, all
devoted animal rights activists, “failed to allege an objectively
reasonable chill [on their speech], and, therefore, failed to establish
94
an injury-in-fact.”
C. Proposed Ag-Gag Laws
The recently proposed state bills take a variety of approaches to
limiting audio and video recording inside agricultural facilities. This
Section groups these approaches into five categories: 1) broadly
banning all audio and video recording on farms as “agricultural
interference”; 2) criminalizing employment fraud in agricultural
settings; 3) forbidding distribution of recordings; 4) redefining
trespass to specifically include agricultural facilities; and 5) requiring
rapid reporting of animal abuse. As argued in Part I, broad bans on
agricultural interference and bans on distribution of recordings face
the strongest First Amendment challenges.
1. Agricultural Interference
Most of the proposed bills define a new offense of “agricultural
interference.” These bills generally prohibit producing a sound or
video recording at an agricultural or livestock facility without the
95
owner’s consent. In some cases, these prohibitions are limited to
recording devices which are left on the premises rather than being
96
97
held and operated by a person. The first versions of Iowa’s and

93. Blum v. Holder, No. 11–12229–JLT, 2013 WL 1097818, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 18, 2013).
94. Id. at *7.
95. S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Penn. 2013); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012);
S. 184, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.
5172, 235th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (the New York bill used the term
“tampering” instead of “interference” but was otherwise the same as the others).
96. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a) (West 2012); Penn. H.R. 683.
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98

Utah’s bills included this prohibition, but both were later amended
to eliminate the broad prohibition against unauthorized recording
(instead, they found success by focusing on agricultural fraud,
99
described below).
The agricultural interference bills impose penalties ranging from
misdemeanors to felonies, depending on the number of violations and
the amount of financial damage caused by the release of
100
information. In one 2011 proposal in Iowa, victims were also
permitted to pursue civil damages up to three times “all actual and
101
consequential” losses. In cases where lowered sales or a meat recall
could be traced to publication of a disconcerting video, that provision
could potentially impose massive costs on undercover filmmakers.
This type of bill represents the broadest approach to ag-gag laws.
As discussed above, because these laws could potentially implicate a
wide range of otherwise innocent activities, they would likely face
strong First Amendment challenges for overbreadth and content102
neutral restrictions.
2. Agricultural Fraud
The two successful recent ag-gag bills approached the activistfilmmaking issue by criminalizing “agricultural fraud.” This type of
103
104
bill, passed in Iowa
and Utah,
and frequently proposed
105
elsewhere, hampers activists by restricting their ability to gain
employment on farms. Typically, the undercover videos are made
when an animal rights group, such as the Humane Society, sends an
106
activist to apply for employment at a target facility. The activist

97. H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011).
98. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a).
99. See infra Part II.C.2.
100. See bills cited supra note 11.
101. Iowa H.R. 589 (2011).
102. See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
103. IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012); H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012).
104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2012).
105. Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (banning making a “false statement or
representation” to obtain agricultural employment if the false statement “intentionally causes
economic damage”); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2013); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011).
106. See, e.g., Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public
Scrutiny, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factory-farm-abuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674
(describing
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works at the farm for a few weeks, obtaining footage, talking with
107
other employees, and building a record of a pattern of abuse. If the
employer asks the activist whether he or she is affiliated with an
animal rights group, the activist needs to lie to continue the
108
investigation.
The agricultural-fraud bills therefore attack
undercover investigations by outlawing deception in the employment
context.
Iowa’s successfully enacted ag-gag law criminalizes obtaining
access to an agricultural facility by false pretenses, as well as
intentionally making a false statement in an employment application
109
with the intent to commit an unauthorized act at the facility. The
law attempts to entirely evade First Amendment issues by not even
110
mentioning audio or video recordings in the law. Instead, it focuses
on employment procedures, providing a benign cover for its actual
111
purpose—to block undercover investigations of farms.
Utah’s legislators also originally drafted their ag-gag bill
112
pursuant to the broad “agricultural-interference” model, but they
were only able to pass the bill after amending it to mainly address
agricultural fraud (the law also includes a trespass provision,
113
discussed below). Utah’s law, like Iowa’s, criminalizes obtaining
114
It
employment in agricultural settings under false pretenses.
additionally criminalizes obtaining employment “with the intent to
record an image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation” when
115
on notice that the owner does not authorize recording. Thus, in
contrast to Iowa, Utah’s agricultural fraud statute explicitly addresses
audio and video recording.
Following its successes in Iowa and Utah, the agricultural-fraud
approach is likely to proliferate as other states’ legislators continue to
introduce ag-gag laws. These laws can expand farm owners’ rights

how the activist author applied to work at an egg farm in Iowa to produce video footage using a
pinhole camera).
107. See, e.g., id.
108. See, e.g., id.
109. H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012).
110. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 106.
111. See, e.g., id.
112. H.R. 187, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012).
113. H.R. 187 3d Substitute, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012).
114. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2012).
115. Id. § 76-6-112(2)(c)(i) .
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without explicitly addressing speech issues. This strategy helps evade
constitutional issues. Unfortunately, for that reason, the employment
fraud laws are less susceptible to challenges based on First
Amendment grounds than the agricultural-interference and
distribution bills.
3. Crime to Distribute
Some proposed bills criminalize possession and distribution of
116
unauthorized agricultural recordings. For example, Indiana’s S.B.
373 charges a person who “distributes, disseminates, or transfers” an
unauthorized recording of an agricultural facility, if the recording was
made “with intent to defame or directly or indirectly harm the
business relationship between an agricultural operation and its
117
customers.”
This type of restriction has huge implications for any news outlet,
activist group, or individual that relies on the recordings for
journalistic, educational, or persuasive purposes. These bills are so
broadly drafted that the mere receipt of an email might constitute a
violation. A website editor who publishes a video or photo on a
website, in a media broadcast, or perhaps even on a personal blog or
social media page, could be guilty of “distributing” the recording
under the meaning of the bill.
Going even further, Pennsylvania’s H.B. 683 bans “uploads,
118
downloads, [and] transfers” of unauthorized recordings. Under such
a law, any person who downloaded or shared a video that they
themselves did not even make could be in violation of the statute.
These bills could criminalize innocuous behavior, such as sending
videos in personal emails, posting them to food safety blogs, and
sharing videos via social media, even for people who played no role in
producing the video.
By criminalizing the publication of undercover farm videos, these
bills blatantly seek to limit the public impact of the videos. The goal
of the activists’ undercover activities is to widely distribute the
footage and expose abusive and unsanitary practices at factory farms.
By chilling the willingness of third parties to distribute the footage,

116. H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.R. 589,
84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011).
117. S.B. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).
118. H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2013).
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these bills result in the concealment of any incriminating evidence
from the public.
This type of ag-gag bill is likely to face strong First Amendment
challenges because it is overly broad, and may limit otherwise
119
protected speech.
4. Redefining Trespass
In some states, legislators have focused on linking undercover
120
recordings with trespass.
For example, Utah’s ag-gag law bans unauthorized recording
121
“while . . . committing criminal trespass.” This trespass-related third
prong of Utah’s agricultural-interference law is not a strong bar to
undercover recording because Utah’s definition of criminal trespass
does not clearly encompass activists’ video recordings. Utah defines
criminal trespass as unlawfully entering or remaining on property and
intending “to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to
any property,” or entering the property unlawfully with the intent to
122
commit a crime. Under this definition, undercover recording
arguably does not constitute criminal trespass in Utah. The statute
bans causing annoyance or injury “to any person,” and separately
123
bans causing “damage to any property.” Animal activists’ films are
not intended to cause annoyance or injury to any individual person,
and they are not intended to cause damage to the agricultural
124
property itself.
Activists will also be protected by the statutorily defined defense
that an entrant’s conduct did not “substantially interfere with” the
125
owner’s use of the property. By design, animal activists’ filming
does not interfere with the owner’s use of the property. The filming is
done in secret; if it substantially interfered with the owner’s use, it
could not remain hidden.

119. See supra Parts I.B., I.C.
120. S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); S. 1184, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2012); H.R. 187 3d Substitute, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012); S. Amend. 3297, 84th Gen. Assemb.
(Iowa 2011).
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(d) (West 2012).
122. Id. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i)–(ii).
123. Id. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i).
124. See id.
125. Id. § 76-6-206(4)(b).
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This type of law does not face strong First Amendment
challenges because, like the agricultural-fraud laws, it evades issues of
expression.
5. Rapid Reporting of Abuses
An increasingly popular approach is to propose ag-gag bills
which are essentially disguised as animal protection statutes. These
bills institute very short time limits in which animal abuse must be
126
reported to enforcement authorities. Although these bills appear on
their face to institute a protection against animal abuses, in practice
they would function to limit the breadth and depth of activists’
undercover investigations.
These bills would impose reporting windows from one to three
127
days. By narrowing the window in which activists can record and
report violations, the bill would severely limit the activists’
surveillance capacity. Undercover activists would have to launch an
investigation knowing that they would be required to expose their
investigation within one to three days of capturing any abuses. The
time limitation would essentially bar activists from in-depth
exploration of a facility’s practices, thereby crippling activists’ ability
to develop a record of patterns of abuse and diluting the quality of
the investigations.
This approach is especially pernicious because it is easily
couched as an effort to protect animals. The bills’ ultimate goal is to
stifle undercover journalism in agricultural settings, but they can be
pitched to the public as intended to ensure rapid prosecution of
128
animal abusers. Animal-rights activists have not been fooled: they
have clearly identified these bills as ag-gag efforts and included them
126. See e.g., Assemb. 343, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2013); S. 1248, 108th Gen. Assemb.
(Tenn. 2013); Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (requiring any person who “reasonably
suspects” animal abuse to report it to authorities within twenty-four hours); H. 0110, 2013 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) (establishing that any person who records “cruelty to livestock” shall
have “a duty to report such activities to law enforcement authorities . . . within 24 hours of the
recording’s creation”); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. Amend. 3297, 84th Gen.
Assemb. (Iowa 2011); S. 695. 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); Leg. 915, 102d Leg.,
2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); see also Iowa S. Amend. 3297 (providing that acting as a whistleblower can
be an affirmative defense to a charge of agricultural trespass, but only to defendants who report
abuses within 72 hours of witnessing them).
127. See bills cited supra note 126.
128. See Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses from the Public, THE
HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/campaigns/factory_farming/
fact-sheets/ag_gag.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2013).
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in their public action campaigns. Still, politicians may face an easier
battle in justifying the bills to their constituents. Furthermore, this
type of bill does not face strong First Amendment challenges.
D. Hostile Opposition and Political Reframing
The recent ag-gag bills have faced hostile public opposition in
130
every state where they have been proposed. National animal-rights
groups are focusing their organizing efforts on defeating these bills,
131
132
and celebrities from Katherine Heigl to Bob Barker have voiced
their opposition. The outrage has not come only from animal-rights
activists. For example, in Minnesota, rural daily newspapers
published a series of critical editorials pointing out that properly run
133
farms have nothing to hide.
Presumably in response to this opposition, some legislatures are
reframing their justifications for the bills. Introductory text to the
New York bill explains that the bill’s purpose is to combat security
134
problems at New York’s “family farms.” It cites crimes such as “the
unlawful injection of cattle with antibiotics” and “theft of anhydrous
ammonia fertilizer, utilized by meth addicts to make illegal
135
substances.” The introductory text explains that “farmers need to
be more aware of where their security weaknesses are” to
“discourage trespass and tampering which may weaken the safety of

129. See, e.g., id.; Ed Sayres, Ag-Gag Bills Threaten Our Children, Our Freedom and Our
Animals, ASPCA BLOG (Mar. 22, 2012, 10:14 AM), http://www.aspca.org/ Blog/eds-corner-aggag (referencing the ag-gag bills in Tennessee, Nebraska, and Missouri).
130. Interestingly, an internet search of local newspapers and animal rights activists’
websites indicates that the pre-existing laws in Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota were not
controversial at the time of their passage.
131. Sean P. Means, Heigl Lobbies Utah Senate Against ‘Ag-Gag’ Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Mar. 1, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/blogsmoviecricket/53625223-66/bill-utahgag-heigl.html.csp.
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136

our food supply.” Buried in the statutory text, a careful reader will
find that “tampering” includes audio and video recording without the
137
owner’s consent.
Given the outcry from the animal rights community, this textual
trickery did not successfully hide the bill’s real goal of stifling activist
138
penetration of farm operations. However, the bill’s reframing may
indicate a strategy legislatures will pursue in the future.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR PROTECTING FURTHER UNDERCOVER
ACTIVISM
As explored in Part II, the First Amendment case against ag-gag
bills is not bulletproof, especially considering that bills are more likely
to pass in forms that avoid blatantly implicating First Amendment
rights.
Therefore, in addition to opposing enactment of the legislation,
activists should plan their investigations so that they can best avoid
liability. This Note offers three suggestions to activists: 1) avoid lying
to the greatest extent possible in seeking employment on farms—use
real names, addresses, and employment histories; 2) recruit current
employees or professional journalists to document abuses; and 3)
ensure that the legitimacy of any video is unquestionable. Activists
should take these precautions even in states without ag-gag laws.
First, activists should avoid lying as much as possible in seeking
employment on farms. Because the First Amendment does not bar
139
claims against undercover reporters, targeted farms will be able to
press charges against activists for agricultural-employment fraud (in
states with that type of ag-gag law) and traditional fraud (in states
without ag-gag laws). Agricultural employers therefore have strong
reasons to ask questions designed to create conditions of fraud for
undercover activists. By asking, “Are you affiliated with an animal
rights group?” or by requiring applicants to sign papers stating that
they are not carrying any surveillance equipment, farm operators can
lay the groundwork for claims of fraud against any person who lied on

136. Id.
137. See S. 5172, 235th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
138. See, e.g., Laura Allen, NY Bill to Ban Undercover Investigations, ANIMAL L.
COALITION (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.animallawcoalition.com/animals-and-politics/
article/1805.
139. See supra Part I.B.
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their application. Farmers were already asking similar questions
before the 2011 flood of ag-gag bills across the country. In 2010, an
Iowa egg farm asked a Humane Society investigator, “Are you
affiliated with a news organization, labor union, or animal protection
140
group?”
Under Iowa’s newly passed law, the investigator’s
deceptive answer to that question could have garnered him a
141
misdemeanor conviction. Activists obviously cannot answer such
questions honestly if they wish to obtain employment on farms.
However, they should use their real names, addresses, and
employment histories to rebuff fraud charges to the greatest extent
possible.
Second, recruiting current employees or professional journalists
to conduct undercover investigations might provide important
protection. Current employees may be better protected as undercover
investigators because they will have already obtained employment
truthfully, and so may not be punishable under employment-fraud aggag laws. Recruiting such employees poses serious risks for animal
rights groups, however. By initiating contact with existing employees
in an attempt to convince them to surreptitiously record their
employers, activists would make themselves vulnerable to detection
by the employer. For that reason, this strategy is likely not a viable
long-term solution. Better yet, professional journalists could be sent
into the factory farms to conduct the investigations. By virtue of their
positions as journalists, they are more clearly protected by the First
Amendment. However, as Food Lion demonstrates, even this
142
protection may be somewhat limited.
Lastly, activists’ strongest protection, regardless of the type of
challenge they may face, is the accuracy of their footage. Undercover
investigators should take pains to make sure that the legitimacy of
their documentation is unassailable. Each day’s filming should
include corporate logos and uniforms, individuals known to work in a
certain location, and whatever other markers of truth can be found.
In distributing the footage, activists and their sponsoring
organizations should refrain from excessive editing or embellishment
to avoid future allegations that the images were doctored or
selectively edited.

140. Carlson, supra note 106.
141. See H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012).
142. See supra Part I.B.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Contemporary activists’ undercover films of farm conditions are
part of a long tradition of undercover journalism exposing health
143
issues and animal abuses in livestock facilities. And today, just as in
the past, powerful entities whose profits are threatened by these
exposés are mounting a major effort to stop activists from making any
144
more undercover videos.
There is some hope that these laws can be challenged under the
First Amendment, but in truth, the constitutional defenses against the
bills are not as strong as some opponents suggest—particularly for the
agricultural-fraud bills that are emerging as the most successful
approach.
In response, activists need to structure their investigations in
anticipation of future legal challenges. Ultimately, their best hope
may be that the power of their films sparks congressional action to
protect whistleblowers on factory farms.

143. See, e.g., UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1905).
144. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 106.

